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PUTTING MANDATORY SUMMARY JURY
TRIAL BACK ON THE DOCKET:




ITH the spiraling costs,' excessive delays,2 and exploding
caeoads of the civil courts,3 many disputants view traditional
litigation as unable to meet their conflict resolution needs.4 More and
more parties are turning away from the judicial system and are resort-
ing to private dispute resolution firms.5 Recognizing this growing
* Assistant Professor of Law, Bentley College. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the research assistance of Margo Reder, Adjunct Professor of Law and Re-
search Associate, Bentley College, on this Article.
1. Critics of the court system claim that $80 billion are swallowed up in legal fees
and insurance premiums each year. Some legal scholars challenge that figure, claim-
ing that the price tag is somewhere between $51 and $58 billion dollars. Michele Ga-
len, Guilty!, Bus. Wk., Apr. 13, 1992, at 60, 61-62.
2. Id at 60-61, 63. Once filed, the typical civil lawsuit languishes for some 19
months in court. Bob Cohn, The Lawsuit Cha-Cha, Newsweek, Aug. 26, 1991, at 58.
Due to speedy trial requirements, civil matters often are deferred to allow judges to
deal first with the ever-increasing number of criminal cases. Charles F. Webber,
Mandatory Summary Jury Tria Playing by the Rules?, 56 U. Chi. L Rev. 1495, 1500-
01 (1989); Judith M. Filner & Margaret Shaw, Update.: Development of Dispute Reso-
lution in State Courts, Forum (National Institute for Dispute Resolution), Summer/
Fall 1993, at 36; Galen, supra note 1, at 61.
3. Between 1984 and 1990, civil filings in the state courts have increased from
14.1 million to 18.4 million cases. Galen, supra note 1, at 61. In the federal courts,
civil lawsuits have jumped 300% since 1960. d However, some legal scholars ques-
tion whether any litigation explosion is actually taking place. Marc Galanter, Reading
the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know)
About our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L Rev. 4, 61-71
(1983) (asserting that claims of litigation explosion are linked to poor contemporary
legal scholarship and policy analysis); Shirley A. iegand, A New Light Bulb or the
Work of the Devil? A Current Assessment of Summary Jury Trials, 69 Or. L Rev. 87,
95-97 (1990) (arguing that case filings, case filings per authorized judgeship, and the
number of civil trials have actually decreased between 1985 and 1988).
4. Filner & Shaw, supra note 2, at 36; Galen, supra note 1, at 60-61; see infra note
5 and accompanying text.
5. See Deborah L. Jacobs, Keeping It Out of Court, Mgmt. Rev., Oct. 1992, at 54-
55; Robert D. Raven, The Future of Court-Annexed ADR, Disp. Resol. Mag., Spring
1994, at 2. This assertion is bolstered by figures released by nonprofit and for-profit
ADR providers. For example, the nonprofit American Arbitration Association re-
ported that its case filings exploded over 150%, from 39,609 in 1984 to 63,171 in 1993.
Ted E. Pons, AAA Business Expanded in 1993, Disp. Resol. Times, Spring 1994, at 1.
The leading for-profit ADR provider, Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services,
Inc., saw its caseload jump to 14,000 in 1992, up 25% over its 1991 filings. Jane Birn-
baum & Morton D. Sosland, Coming to Terms-Without Bringing in the Lawyers,
Newsweek, Apr. 13,1992, at 63. In these budget-conscious times, many businesses, in
particular, are looking to ADR to help cut costs. In a 1992 Business Week/Harris
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trend towards alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"),6 an increasing
number of state and federal courts are offering a wide range of ADR
mechanisms to litigants.7
One controversial ADR mechanism is the summary jury trial
("SJT"), a nonbinding settlement process that involves summary
presentations of proof before an advisory jury.8 For years, SJT has
generated divided federal court opinions and legal critiques on its
mandatory use.9 Some courts and legal commentators have rejected
compulsory SJT as violative of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(the "Rules") and as exceeding the courts' inherent power to manage
case dockets.10 Other judges and legal analysts have asserted that
there is substantial legal support for mandatory SJT under these same
Rules and within the courts' inherent authority.'" The 1993 In re
NLO, Inc. case,' 2 rejecting compulsory SJT, renewed the swirl of con-
troversy over SJT and focused attention once more on this conten-
tious legal debate. However, December 1993 changes to the Rules
and a closer analysis of earlier Supreme Court decisions have turned
the tables again in favor of mandatory SJT. 3
Executive poll, a whopping 97% of polled business executives stated that their com-
panies are making greater use of ADR to resolve their disputes in a more cost-effec-
tive manner. Galen, supra note 1, at 66.
6. The acronym "ADR" refers to a collection of processes that include, but are
not limited to, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, mini-trial, summary jury trial, and
other hybrid procedures. See Stephen B. Goldberg et al., Dispute Resolution (1985);
Susan M. Leeson & Bryan M. Johnston, Ending It: Dispute Resolution in America
(1988). See generally Essays on the Future of ADR: A Prospective Look from Three
Viewpoints-Jurist, Educator, and Practitioner, 14 Pepp. L. Rev. 769 (1987) (providing
an interesting collection of essays on ADR); Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry,
Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 424
(1986) (providing a basic overview of benefits and criticisms of ADR).
7. Ftiner & Shaw, supra note 2, at 36-43; Raven, supra note 5, at 2; Note,
Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Triab Guidelines for Ensuring Fair and Ef-
fective Processes, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1086, 1086-87, 1090-91 (1990). More than 1200
state and federal courts nationwide are offering ADR options to litigants. Galen,
supra note 1, at 64. As of 1992, 27 states and the District of Columbia had formally
adopted comprehensive ADR programs. Filner & Shaw, supra note 2, at 36. Today,
virtually every state is undertaking pilot or experimental court-connected ADR pro-
grams. Id. About 40% of the federal district courts and nearly 50% of the federal
appeals courts either promote or mandate ADR use as a precondition to trial. Jacobs,
supra note 5, at 55.
8. See Thomas D. Lambros, Summary Jury Trials, Litig., Fall 1986, at 52; Law-
rence J. Tell & Paul Angiolillo, From Jury Selection to Verdict-In Hours, Bus. Wk.,
Sept. 7, 1987, at 48; infra notes 51-65 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 66-185 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 119-44 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 167-85 and accompanying text.
12. 5 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 1993).
13. See infra notes 177-97 and accompanying text.
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Part I of this Article provides an overview of SJT and discusses the
invention of SJT by Judge Thomas D. Lambros."4 This part considers
SJT objectives, procedures, and basis under the Rules.15 The main
criticisms of and concerns about SJT also are highlighted, along with
applicable studies on SJT issues.' 6 Part LI analyzes the divergent fed-
eral court decisions on mandatory SJT, focusing on opposing court
interpretations of Rule 16.11 Recent changes in statutory law and the
Rules now make it clear that judges have the power to require SJT
without the parties' consent.' 8 This part argues that the federal courts
derive this authority from these legal changes and from the courts'
inherent authority to manage effectively the case docket. 9 Part III
suggests that, although they possess the legal authority to mandate
SJT, federal judges lack policies for SJT case selection and process-
ing.' This Article argues that judges should exercise this power under
court guidelines aimed at protecting party and court interests.' 1 Part
III therefore makes several recommendations for case screening and
supervision that seek to enhance SJT benefits while accounting for
SJT criticisms.' The suggested guidelines call for improved court rec-
ord-keeping and evaluation as well as increased attorney education on
SJT and other ADR mechanisms . 3
14. Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods
of Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1984) [hereinafter referred to in text as the
"Lambros Report"].
After reviewing the Lambros Report, the Judicial Conference of the United States
adopted a resolution endorsing the experimental use of SIT to help promote settle-
ment. Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 88
(1984). The resolution stated: "Resolved, that the Judicial Conference endorses the
experimental use of summary jury trials as a potentially effective means of promoting
the fair and equitable settlement of potentially lengthy civil jury cases." Id.
15. See infra notes 24-50 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 66-114 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 115-85 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 186-97 and accompanying text.
19. The Supreme Court clearly has recognized that the courts possess inherent
authority to control and manage their dockets, independent of the Rules and statu-
tory law. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 160-61 (1973); Link v. Wabash R.R., 370
U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962). This inherent power allows the courts to develop procedural
mechanisms that promote the efficient, orderly disposition of cases while preserving
the integrity of the judicial process. Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 160-61; Link, 370 U.S. at
630-31; G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 651 (7th Cir.
1989); Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 604 (D. Minn.
1988); Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1988). The
main limit on the exericse of this discretion is that the procedural modifications
should not interfere with or prevent the final determination of the case by a jury. See
Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 159-60; infra notes 170-85 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 198-211 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 199-211 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 199-211 and accompanying text.
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I. OVERVIEW OF SUMMARY JURY TRIAL
Federal and state court systems have tried to deal creatively with
public concerns about the time, cost, and delays associated with tradi-
tional litigation. SJT is an example of a judicial innovation aimed at
responding effectively to these concerns. This nonbinding process en-
courages settlement while providing litigants with some of the key ele-
ments of an actual jury trial.
A. Creation of SJT
Federal court Judge Thomas Lambros invented SJT while consider-
ing two personal injury cases slated for trial before two separate, full
juries.24 Judge Lambros thought that each case should have settled,
but the parties decided to go forward with a full trial.' s In the 1984
Lambros Report, he outlined the main obstacles to settlement that led
to his creation and implementation of SJT:
Litigants may refuse to accept a compromise because emotionally
they need a "day in court" to tell their story. Absent the opportu-
nity to hear both sides of the case presented to the finders of fact, a
lawyer and his client may be unable to objectively recognize the
weaknesses in their position. The lawyer and his client may believe
they can "pull off" a weak case if only they can get it in front of a
jury.2 6
Judge Lambros stated that SJT, with the aura of the courtroom ex-
perience, could bring down these typical barriers to settlement. His
report concluded that these obstacles could be overcome once the
parties had a chance to state their case, listen to the other side's view,
and learn of a jury's reaction to the conflicting evidence. 7 Judge
Lambros asserted that other methods of ADR, such as mediation, pri-
24. Lambros, supra note 14, at 463.
25. Id. Judge Lambros mused:
It occurred to me that if only the parties could gaze into a crystal ball and be
able to predict, with a reasonable amount of certainty, what a jury would do
in their respective cases, the parties and counsel would be more willing to
reach a settlement rather than going through the expense and aggravation of
a full jury trial.
Id.
26. Lambros, supra note 14, at 468; see also McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120
F.R.D. 43, 50 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (upholding mandatory use of SJT); Federal Reserve
Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 604-05 (D. Minn. 1988) (same).
27. Lambros, supra note 14, at 468-69, 476-77; see McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 50; Fed-
eral Reserve Bank, 123 F.R.D. at 604-05; James J. Alfini, Summary Jury Trials in State
and Federal Courts: A Comparative Analysis of the Perceptions of Participating Law-
yers, 4 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 213 (1989) (reporting a comparison study of SJT use
in Florida state and federal program) [hereinafter referred to in text as the "Alfini
study"]. Under the state program, the Alfini study showed that SJT did help to im-
prove attorney-client discussions over appropriate settlement postures. Defense and
plaintiff attorneys believed that SJT did help their clients to have a more realistic view
of settlement offers. Alfini, supra, at 218.
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vate judging, or court-annexed arbitration, do not afford disputants
the same opportunity to deal fully with these barriers to settlement.28
Judge Lambros believed that SJT successfully balances the need to
reduce costs and caseloads against the rights of parties seeking justice
from the court system.29
Based on these assumptions, Judge Lambros devised SJT as a court-
initiated, court-supervised settlement procedure3" that would save the
costs and time of a full-blown trial for both the courts and the par-
ties.31 The process initially was envisioned as voluntary and nonbind-
ing.32 Judge Lambros believed that SJT would help parties predict
juror perceptions of liability and damages,33 and, therefore, serve to
encourage settlement without a complete trial?34 As a settlement tool,
28. Lambros, supra note 14, at 468. The report also summarizes the other main
forms of ADR being utilized to reduce court caseloads: arbitration, mediation, pri-
vate judging, neutral experts, and mini-trial. Id. at 466-68.
29. Id. at 476. But see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adver-
sary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR", 19 Fla. St. U. L
Rev. 1, 6-13, 18-21 (1991) (expressing concern that ADR mechanisms often empha-
size quantity over quality of justice in disposing of cases); Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey Rice,
Jury-Determined Settlements and Summary Jury Trials: Observations About Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution in an Adversary Culture, 19 Fla. St. U. L Rev. 89, 90-91, 95,
97-98 (1991) (suggesting that use of voluntary, binding ADR will help shift emphasis
from quantity to quality of justice in case resolution).
30. Lambros, supra note 14, at 467-68.
31. Id at 465, 468, 476. But see infra notes 66-86 and accompanying text.
32. Lambros, supra note 14, at 469, 477.
33. Id at 468-69. SJT is the only ADR mechanism that utilizes the tradition of
trial by jury. Id at 468. Judge Lambros noted:
It is my perception that the sole bar to settlement in many cases is the uncer-
tainty of how a jury might perceive liability and damages. Such uncertainty
often arises, for example, in cases involving a "reasonableness" standard of
liability, such as in negligence litigation .... The half-day proceeding is
designed to provide a "no-risk" method by which the parties may obtain the
perception of six jurors on the merits of their case without a large investment
of time or money.
Id at 469; see Leeson & Johnston, supra note 6, at 25.
34. Lambros, supra note 14, at 465, 468, 476. A number of legal commentators
have questioned the appropriateness of court policies that focus on settlement as a
positive or best outcome of legal disputes. Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of
Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 Tu. L. Rev. 1, 15-27 (1987); Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 Yale LJ. 1073, 1075-89 (1984); iegand, supra note 3, at 97-98. But see
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement" Uses and Abuses of the
Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 485, 486-90, 498-514 (1985).
Prof. Menkel-Meadow correctly states:
Critics like Fiss ... assume that adjudication is the preferred process and
challenge the "settlors" to prove up their claims.... My own view is that
settlement is now the norm. The pertinent question is how can it be used
most effectively (for the parties and for other users of the system) when
traditional adjudicators are brought into the process.
Id. at 513.
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SJT is normally considered to be a confidential process closed to third
parties. 35
The new SJT process was utilized in the second of the two personal
injury cases before Judge Lambros, and the parties settled the matter
without a full jury trial.36 Judge Lambros and other federal court
judges continued to experiment with SJT on their own, viewing the
procedure as complementing, not replacing, a host of other ADR
mechanisms.37 In the Lambros Report, supportive federal judges indi-
cated substantial cost and time savings through the use of SJT.3 8 Even
in instances in which SJT did not result in settlement, some federal
judges hailed the process as clarifying issues of law and fact prior to
trial and improving attorney preparation for, and accelerating case
processing of, any subsequent trial.39
35. Lambros, supra note 14, at 471. The relevant case on SJT access asserts that
both the process and documents utilized in SJT should be kept confidential, Cincin-
nati Gas and Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F. 2d 900, 903-05 (6th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989) (barring newspapers from access to SJT of contract dis-
pute involving design and construction of nuclear power plant); see Susan Tillotson,
Note, Summary Jury Trials: Should the Public Have Access?, 16 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
1069 (1989) (analyzing and supporting confidentiality for SJT as settlement proce-
dure). This SJT confidentiality has been criticized in instances involving public inter-
est matters that should be resolved in a public forum and that may set important
precedent for society. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 29, at 25-29; see infra note 206 and
accompanying text. The same criticism also applies to other confidential ADR mech-
anisms used in both court-connected and private arenas.
36. Lambros, supra note 14, at 463. The second case involved a products liability
action based upon the assertion of a defective football helmet. Id.
37. Id.
38. The Lambros Report contained findings of experimental SJT use in the North-
ern District of Ohio. The statistics showed that 90% of all cases selected for SJT were
settled before trial. Of SJTs actually held, 92% resulted in settlement. Id. at 472-73.
Generally, settling cases without a trial can reduce the expenditure of time and money
by the parties as well as the courts and taxpayers. Judge Lambros estimated that the
49 SJTs saved the court over $73,000 in reduced juroft-osts alone. His report pointed
to increased SJT use in Ohio and other federal district courts as further supporting his
assertion of the cost and time savings of SJT. Id. at 473-76.
Aside from Judge Lambros's district in Ohio, district court judges in Montana,
Michigan, Colorado, Pennsylvania, Florida, and Hawaii also utilized the process suc-
cessfully and pointed to substantial cost and time savings. Id. at 474-76; see McKay v.
Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 49-50 (E.D. Ky. 1988); see also S. Arthur Spiegel,
Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 829 (1986) (recounting successful SJT use in
Southern District of Ohio).
39. Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 607 (D. Minn.
1988); Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1988). In
Arabian American Oil, Judge Kovachevich asserted:
Even if the summary procedures do not culminate in settlement of the case,
the value of the summary trial in crystallizing the issues and the proof is
immeasurable to the later binding trial, to which all parties come more fully
prepared and rehearsed in their roles and the trial procedure .... Many
attorneys come to trial prepared; others do not. After the jury is sworn in an
involved case, it is an embarrassing professional exercise before the court
and jury to see lawyers floundering in their presentations .... The reality is
that too many will not get ready until the day of a trial; a summary trialforces that day and that preparation!
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In creating SJT, Judge Lambros looked to support from various
provisions of the 1983 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The report
noted that Rule 1 directs courts to interpret the Rules "to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. '40 The
report also stated that Rule 1 calls for judicial creativity, through
mechanisms such as SJT, to meet the Rule 1 requirements of rapid,
cheap, and fair dispute resolution.4 '
Judge Lambros further stated that Rule 16,42 in conjunction with
Rule 1, explicitly grants courts broad discretion to manage pre-trial
activities43 aimed at "expediting the disposition of the action" 4 and
"facilitating the settlement of the case.",45 In addition, Rule 16 sug-
gests that alternatives to traditional litigation be considered to aid set-
tlement,' stating: "The participants at any conference under this rule
may consider and take action with respect to ... (7) the possibility of
settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute
... and (10) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the
action."'47 The report concluded that Rules 1 and 16 encourage the
development and utilization of settlement tools such as SJT. Judge
Lambros further noted that the creation of SJT was spurred in part by
Rule 39(c)'s express provision for an advisory jury to assist judges in
rendering decisions.'
Lastly, Judge Lambros added that Rule 83 allows district courts to
regulate their caseload in any manner not inconsistent with the Rules,
Id at 449; see Bobby M. Harges, The Promise of the Mandatory Summary Jury Trial,
63 Temp. L. Rev. 799, 806-07 (1990).
Some legal commentators have suggested that the SJT judge should not participate
as the trier of fact in any subsequent litigation. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 29, at 43.
The concern is based upon the view that settlement discussions involve the revelation
of information that would not be admissible during a trial and would taint any judge's
determinations in subsequent litigation. Id at 43 n.211. This approach fails to recog-
nize, however, that the jury is the trier of fact in most subsequent trials. Harges, supra,
at 810. In addition, this reasoning would lead to the untenable conclusion that nojudge would be able to undertake any meaningful settlement discussions in pre-trial
conferences because of impartiality concerns. Id.
40. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; Lambros, supra note 14, at 469.
41. Lambros, supra note 14, at 469.
42. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5) states: "In any action, the court may in its discretion
direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it
for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes as ... [flacilitating the
settlement of the case."
43. Lambros, supra note 14, at 469.
44. Id; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(1).
45. Lambros, supra note 14, at 469; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5).
46. Lambros, supra note 14, at 469.
47. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7), (11) (emphasis added). These provisions were
amended in 1993. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
48. Lambros, supra note 14, at 470. "In all actions not triable of right by a jury
the court upon motion or of its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury
.... "Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(c). But see Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506,508




further enhancing the opportunity for districts to adopt novel ap-
proaches to settlement.49 However, Judge Lambros did not limit the
authority to conduct SJT to the explicit language of the Rules. His
report also supported SJT use under the court's inherent power to
manage effectively its docket.5 0
B. Basic SJT Procedures Under the Lambros Report
A magistrate or judge initiates SJT only after completion of the dis-
covery process and with no motions pending.5 Upon the completion
of discovery, each party submits trial briefs on the legal issues and
requested jury instructions. 2 During the pre-SJT conference, the
judge works with the attorneys to narrow issues of law and fact. 3
Counsel objections on anticipated evidence are also dealt with at this
time, since formal objections during SJT are discouraged. 4
Potential jurors, drawn from the regular jury pool, complete written
questionnaires to spot potential bias.5 5 The court conducts a brief voir
dire with counsel, limited to two preemptory challenges. Some judges
will inform jurors of their advisory roles prior to SJT, while others do
not inform them until after the verdict is rendered. 6
During SJT, summary presentations of proof are made before a
judge and the advisory panel of jurors.57 Live testimony usually is not
permitted during the half-day proceeding.5 8 In certain instances, how-
ever, the parties have utilized videotape clips to present edited witness
49. Lambros, supra note 14, at 470; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 83. Judge Lambros' district
adopted a local rule that allowed judges to exercise their discretion in utilizing SJT.
Lambros, supra note 14, at 470.
50. Id. See also infra notes 167-85 and accompanying text (discussing the discre-
tion that Rule 16 grants courts in managing their dockets).
51. Lambros, supra note 14, at 470. Nearly 80% of all legal fees are amassed dur-
ing discovery. Galen, supra note 1, at 64. SJT often is criticized because it does not
help to reduce the parties' greatest expenses, which are incurred during the discovery
process. Therefore, SJT's real cost-reductions are derived primarily from limiting the
public and private costs of a trial.
52. Lambros, supra note 14, at 470.
53. Id. at 470-71.
54. Id.; see infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
55. Lambros, supra note 14, at 470-71; see Leeson & Johnston, supra note 6, at 23-
24. The report emphasizes that the SJT makes more cost-effective use of jurors by
paying them for shorter periods of service and recycling jurors paid to appear but not
selected for formal trials. Lambros, supra note 14, at 473.
56. See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text. A survey of Florida attorneys
who utilized a state court SJT program suggested that jurors were less likely to take
their roles seriously if told their verdict was not binding. Alfini, supra note 27, at 217.
This survey data was limited to about 75 attorney respondents and did not take into
account juror perceptions. Id. at 215 & n.10.
57. Lambros, supra note 14, at 471. SJT juries may involve 6 or 12 jurors, but the
number of jurors usually is 6. Leeson & Johnston, supra note 6, at 23.
58. Lambros, supra note 14, at 471.
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testimony.59 Most often, attorneys summarize anticipated testimony
and are free to present exhibits to the jury. Attorneys are limited to
evidence normally admissible at trial, with any representations to be
supported by discovered materials.' Parties or representatives with
settlement authority must be present during these presentations to
maximize chances for settlement.6'
After the presentations, the judge provides the jury with an abbrevi-
ated charge on the applicable law. The jury then deliberates and re-
turns with either consensus or separate advisory verdicts on party
liability and damages. 62 After the verdict, the jurors remain for a fur-
ther question-and-answer period with the parties and their lawyers.
At this stage, the jury helps the disputants to assess their chances for
success at trial. Each party probes the jurors' perceptions to deter-
mine the strengths and weaknesses of each side's case. It is antici-
pated that the advisory verdict and the question-and-answer period
will spur settlement talks between the parties, which normally are me-
diated by the SJT judge.63
During these negotiations, the disputants have the opportunity to
fashion more creative solutions than those that courts have authority
to award. The responsibility to resolve the dispute is placed back
into the hands of the parties.64 If negotiations fail, the parties can
59. Alfini, supra note 27, at 217; Harges, supra note 39, at 806; Thomas B. Met-
zioff, Reconfiguring the Summary Jury Trial, 41 Duke L.J. 806, 830, 859 (1992) [here-
inafter referred to in text as the "Metzloff study"]. In its discretion, the court may
allow the parties to utilize videotape testimony rather than attorney summaries of
testimony. Harges, supra note 39, at 806; Metzloff, supra, at 859. In Stites v. Sunds-
trand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516 (W.D. Mich. 1987), videotape clips were
utilized to allow the jurors to view and listen briefly to party and expert witness testi-
mony. The National Institute for Dispute Resolution has developed an excellent 41
minute videotape on the Stites SJT, which presents an actual SJT, provides juror, law-
yer, and judicial perspectives on SJT, and illustrates its use of videotape testimony.
The videotape is entitled: Dispute Resolution and the Courts, Summary Jury Trial
(National Institute for Dispute Resolution 1988).
60. Lambros, supra note 14, at 471; see infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
61. Leeson & Johnston, supra note 6, at 23, 25; Lambros, supra note 14, at 470.
62. Lambros, supra note 14, at 471; see infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
63. Leeson & Johnston, supra note 6, at 23-25; Lambros, supra note 14, at 469,
471.
64. Note, Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial, supra note 7, at 1092.
In contrast to the adversarial system, which selects one party as the "winner"
and the other as the "loser," consensus-based ADR allows both parties to
view themselves as winners. In both mediation and SJT, parties, with or
without the aid of a neutral party, invent options for mutual gain by making
concessions on issues that they discount in order to gain ground on issues
they view as most important. In so doing, parties often reach a mutually
beneficial solution. The integrative bargaining that consensual ADR pro-
motes allows parties to discover creative solutions that they might never
have considered in litigation.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see Leeson & Johnston, supra note 6, at 3, 105-07.
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follow the normal track of litigation, seeking a new, full trial on the
merits.65
C. Main Criticisms of SJT Process
Judges, lawyers, and scholars initially applauded Judge Lambros'
creativity in inventing SJT, but criticisms began to surface a few years
later. The Seventh Circuit's Judge Richard A. Posner voiced the earli-
est doubts about both the usefulness and ethics of SJT.66 Other legal
commentators soon followed with a barrage of criticisms.67
One of Judge Posner's main concerns was the lack of serious re-
search to support objectively the purported savings in time and money
of SJT and other ADR mechanisms. 68 Judge Posner believed that
proponents made too many sweeping, unsupported conclusions about
SJT in the absence of solid empirical data.69 In his own admittedly
"crude" study, Judge Posner compared settlement rates between vari-
ous federal district court cases in the Sixth Circuit.70 In the study,
Judge Lambros' own district, which heavily utilized SJT, had settle-
ment times that were actually lengthier than those in another district
65. Leeson & Johnston, supra note 6, at 24; Lambros, supra note 14, at 469, 471;
see infra notes 158-66, 181-83 and accompanying text.
66. Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 366 (1986).
67. See infra notes 75-114 and accompanying text.
68. Posner, supra note 66, at 367. Some commentators indicate that SJT demands
a great deal of time, cost, and effort from the courts and the parties. If the matter is
not settled, SJT becomes another added and costly step in the litigation process. In re
NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 158 (6th Cir. 1993); Wiegand, supra note 3, at 101-02; Jennifer
O'Hearne, Comment, Compelled Participation in Innovative Pretrial Proceedings, 84
Nw. U. L. Rev. 290, 319-20 (1989).
Requiring participation in a pre-trial conference, even if settlement is ex-
plored, is permitted under Rule 16(a), and justifiably so, for it may facilitate
settlement at very little expense to the parties and the court A jury trial,
even one of summary nature, however, requires at minimum the time-con-
suming process of assembling a panel and (one would hope) thorough prepa-
ration for argument by counsel, no matter how brief the actual proceeding.
Compelling an unwilling litigant to undergo this process improperly inter-
poses the tribunal into the normal adversarial course of litigation.
In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 158. But see supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
69. Judge Posner asserted:
I am unconvinced by anecdotes, glowing testimonials, confident assertions,
appeals to intuition. Lawyers, including judges and law professors, have
been lazy about subjecting their hunches-which in honesty we should admit
are often little better than prejudices-to systematic empirical testing. ...
Not that the authors of these articles and opinions must be wrong on any of
these assertions; they may be right on all. But they have only impressions;
they have no verified knowledge. If we are to experiment with alternatives
to trials, let us really experiment; let us propose testable hypotheses, and test
them.
Posner, supra note 66, at 367 (footnote omitted).
70. Judge Posner compared settlement rates between the Northern (Judge Lam-




with significantly less SJT use.7' Judge Posner summarized that these
results did not clearly substantiate the claims that SJT increases judi-
cial efficiency and reduces litigation costs. However, Judge Posner did
emphasize the crudeness of his study and added that his study did not
show SJT to be a failure either.'
The judge concluded that these results pointed to the need for more
empirical studies to determine the effectiveness of SJT.73 As with
other ADR mechanisms, few legal scholars have answered this call for
solid scientific research on SJT efficiency, in part because continuing
ADR flexibility and innovation make it difficult to evaluate the pro-
cess effectively.74 Two recent systematic studies on SJT, both limited
in scope, produced mixed results on the time and cost savings of SJT.
Professor James J. Alfini undertook two parallel studies of SJT use
in Florida, based on data collected from court records, questionnaire
surveys, and interviews with participating SJT attorneys.'5 The Alfini
71. Although the Northern District utilized SJT 10 times more than the Southern
district, settlement times were actually shorter in the Southern District (7.6 months)
than in the Northern District (7.8 months) from 1981 to 1985. Id. at 377, 379-80. Non-
Northern District settlement times were only slightly higher than the Northern Dis-
trict settlement times (8 months). Id at 380.
72. Id. at 382.
73. Id. Even SJT proponents recognize the lack of scientific data on the effective-
ness of SJTs. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 29, at 43-44. As District Judge Bertelsman
stated in the McKay decision:
Why not let these judges continue to give them a try, as we have been
doing and as has been endorsed by the Judicial Conference? If the proce-
dure is ineffective and wastes time, we may expect it to be abandoned, since
most federal trial judges are not profligate of their time.
It is true that to date we have only unscientific anecdotal evidence of the
effectiveness of summary jury trials. But not everything in life can be scien-
tifically verified. I have only unscientific anecdotal evidence that Hawaii is
more beautiful than Covington, but I intent to expend a considerable sum to
go there as soon as I get the chance.
But let's not smother a promising infant in the cradle ....
McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43,49-50 (E.D. Ky. 1988). Judge Bertelsman
further argued that the controlled experiment sought by Judge Posner may only yield
the demanded scientific results if SJTs are conducted on a mandatory basis. Id. at 49.
74. As learned at a recent ADR conference, research on ADR effectiveness con-
tinues to defy clear evaluation.
Clearly, one of the central lessons of research on ADR is that program de-
sign and locality affect the impact ADR has on case duration, costs, and
settlement. That is, not all arbitration, mediation or neutral evaluation pro-
grams are alike, and local circumstances ranging from "legal culture" to
court rules may have a substantial impact on a program's effectiveness ....
One of the basic lessons of the Orlando conference was that we know that
ADR works in general, but we do not know whether a given ADR program
will work in a given situation .... We have much to learn before we know
exactly how to maximize the effectiveness of court-connected ADR.
Craig McEwen, State Justice Institute Conference Examines Research on Court-Con-
nected ADR, Disp. Resol. Mag., Spring 1994, at 7; see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 29,
at 9; Metzloff, supra note 59, at 821-24 & n.53.
75. Alfini, supra note 27, at 214-15; see also M. Daniel Jacoubovitch & Carl M.
Moore, Summary Jury Trials in the Northern District of Ohio, 1982 Fed. Jud. Center
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study compared attorney perceptions of SJT utilized under a volun-
tary state program with those of a mandatory federal program in the
same state.76 Most of the state lawyers indicated that they spent fewer
billable hours on the case77 and achieved Judge Lambros' model of a
half-day proceeding.78 In contrast, a majority of the federal lawyers
asserted that their billable hours increased, thereby calling into ques-
tion SJT time and cost savings.79 Also, few federal SJT cases were
completed within the half-day goal.80
The time and cost differences were largely attributed to (1) the
complexity of the federal cases, which involved multiple parties and
more intricate issues of law and fact, (2) the substantial completion of
the expensive discovery process, and (3) the need for more lengthy
post-SJT settlement negotiations.8' Nonetheless, the scheduling of an
SJT date resulted in a higher percentage of federal cases being settled
prior to SJT, illustrating that setting a mandatory SJT date accelerated
the settlement process.'
Subsequent to the Alfini study, Professor Thomas B. Metzloff con-
ducted a study of SJT use in North Carolina under a voluntary state
program, reviewing case histories from 1987-91 and undertaking in-
depth interviews with participating judges and attorneys.8 3 The Met-
Rep. 1 (reporting general survey on SJT use that found overall satisfaction with pro-
cess, but substantial dissent on procedure); Alfini, supra note 27, at n.8 (commenting
on various studies of SJTs); Metzloff, supra note 59, at 821 nn.53 & 59 (same).
76. Alfini, supra note 27, at 214-15. The Alfini study considered 43 state SJT cases
and 51 federal SJT cases. Id. at 215. The Alfini study considered at least one lawyer's
perceptions in about 42 state SJT cases and 40 federal SJT cases. Id. at 215 & n.10.
Most of the state cases involved personal injury disputes. Id. at 221.
77. Id. at 230-31. Some 16% indicated that their billable hours increased, while
about 6% believed that their billable time remained the same. Id. at 231.
78. Id. at 229. In the Alfini study, most state SJT cases were completed in the
half-day format, with 86% completed within 4 or less hours, 10% completed within 5-
8 hours, only 2% taking 9 or more hours, and only 2% requiring 16 or more hours. Id.
79. Id. at 230-31. About 57% claimed their billable hours increased, 30% stated
billable hours decreased and 13% believed that the hours remained the same. Id. at
231.
80. Id. at 229. In federal SJT cases, only 8% were completed within the half-day
time period. Id. About 33% were completed within 5-8 hours and 42% within 9-16
hours. Id. About 17% took more than 16 hours to complete. Id.
81. Id. at 219, 231-32.
82. Id. at 221-22. The Alfini study found that under the state voluntary program,
2% of the cases settled prior to SJT and 20% decided to forego SJT. Id. at 221.
Under the mandatory federal program, about 24% of the scheduled SJT cases settled
before trial. Id.
83. Metzloff, supra note 59, at 826-29. Of the 17 cases analyzed, the author noted
that 11 cases involved assessments of damages, 4 focused on party liability, and 2
concerned determinations of alleged contributory negligence. Id. at 826-27.
Professor Metzloff indicated that this small number of cases over a five-year period
resulted in only about four SJTs being held each year. Id. at 836. This limited use did
little to alleviate state court backlogs. IL Professor Metzloff hypothesized that a
number of factors might explain the sparse bse of SJT, including the lack of attorney




zioff study determined that SJT cases were resolved in a time period
seventy-five percent shorter than cases processed through standard lit-
igation.8s The Metzloff study also found that most attorneys reported
cost savings due primarily to shortened trial times.8s No significant
cost savings in case preparation or the discovery process were
realized.86
The criticism of SJT is not limited to issues of time and cost. Critics
assert that SJT procedures may not accurately predict actual trial out-
comes and thus may prevent parties from properly assessing their
cases. SJT departs from typical trial procedures in several important
ways. First, summary presentations and the lack of live witness testi-
mony may skew juror case impressions8 and prevent meaningful juror
assessments of witness credibility.89
Second, the relaxed evidentiary procedures, coupled with summary
presentations, may overemphasize each attorney's advocacy style and
personality.90 These aspects of SJT may encourage lawyer gamesman-
ship,91 such as attempts to present inadmissible evidence,9 to gather
84. Id at 832.
85. Id. at 835. For example, several cases expected to absorb 2-3 weeks of court
time at trial were either settled during SJT or completed in only 14-18 hours. Id. at
829.
86. Id. at 835-36.
87. Brunet, supra note 34, at 39-40; Webber, supra note 2, at 1515-17; Wiegand,
supra note 3, at 99-100.
Also, in the Alfini study, approximately 64% of the state lawyers and 53% of the
federal lawyers considered the SJT verdict to reflect true trial results. Although a
majority of the attorneys in both court systems found the verdicts to be appropriate,
substantial percentages believed that the verdict was either too low or too high.
These mixed results again cast doubt on the predictive value of SJT. Alfini, supra note
27, at 228-29.
88. Joan K.A. Rowland, Comment, Communication and Psychology Variables:
Reasons to Reject the Summary Jury Trial as an Alternate Dispute Resohtion Tech-
nique, 39 Kan. L. Rev. 1071, 1071 (1991). Rowland notes that the application of em-
pirical research on persuasive communication and psychological stimuli suggests that
SJT substantially alters normal juror evaluations found in a full trial. Id. at 1087-1102.
Rowland indicates that SJT procedures erode juror processing of case information
and juror analysis of witness veracity and interaction-important bases for juror deci-
sion-making in an actual trial. Id. at 1082-85, 1101. Furthermore, she asserts that the
different communication and psychological factors found in SJT summary presenta-
tions will overemphasize attorney strategy and advocacy skills. Id at 1088-91, 1100-
01. In particular, the compressed format favors the plaintiff-attorney's framing of the
issues and unfairly shapes jury interpretations of subsequent evidence. Id. at 1095.
Without strong data to support the use of SJT, Rowland recommends that the process
not be widely adopted until these communication and psychological variables can be
fully understood. Id. at 1101-02.
89. See Brunet, supra note 34, at 40; Vebber, supra note 2, at 1516; Viegand,
supra note 3, at 99.
90. As Judge Posner cautioned, "We do not need a jury of laymen to decide which
of two lawyers is more credible." Posner, supra note 66, at 374; see supra notes 88-89
and accompanying text.
91. Posner, supra note 66, at 374; O'Hearne, supra note 68, at 319-20; see Robert
E. Keeton, Tunes Are Changing For Trials in Court, 21 Fla. St. U. L Rev. 1, 15-17
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information that should have been requested during discovery, or to
learn about opposing counsel's trial strategy and other work
product.93
Several oft-cited SJT cases support these concerns about the predic-
tive value of SJT. For example, SJT judges have divided mock juries
into two separate groups to deliberate after hearing the same SJT
presentations. In these cases, the separate juries came back with op-
posing verdicts despite hearing the same evidence.94 In another case,
the actual trial jury's award was nearly nine times the amount ren-
dered by the SJT jury.9 Contrary to Lambros Report assertions,
these divergent results call into question the predictive value of SJT.96
The Alfini study suggests, however, that a majority of both state
and federal lawyers believe that SJT is reflective of potential juror
verdicts.97 Approximately sixty-four percent of state lawyers and
fifty-three percent of federal lawyers consider the SJT verdict to re-
flect true trial results.98 As a predictor of settlement amounts, the av-
(1993) (cautioning against excessive advocacy that turns lawyers into "Rambo liti-
gators" and moves courts toward "Terminator judges").
In the Alfini study, several attorneys in federal cases asserted that, in complex cases
with uncooperative counsel, SJT "merely added another layer of gamesmanship."
Alfini, supra note 27, at 220 (quoting anonymous attorney questionnaire #13523-311).
92. Since objections are discouraged during SJT, an attorney may try to abuse the
process to introduce clearly inadmissible evidence.
The inability to object ...gave the plaintiffs carte blanche to present
whatever arguments and versions of the facts they chose, regardless of
whether they would have been admissible at trial. Plaintiffs' [presentation]
bore no resemblance to courtroom testimony. They had the look and tone
of investigative journalism and concentrated on creating emotion rather than
addressing the facts.... Rebuttal time also gave the plaintiffs.., an obvious
advantage, since they could have the last word without fear of objection or
surrebuttal.
Webber, supra note 2, at 1516 (citing Clifford J. Zatz, Summary Jury Trial: The Settle-
ment of a Toxic Tort Case, 2 Toxics L. Rep. 929, 933-34 (1988)).
93. Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1988); Metzloff, supra
note 59, at 812-13. Several judges and legal commentators have questioned these con-
cerns about surprise information or attorney work product by asserting that proper
judicial vigilance during discovery under the Rules serves to prevent "[tirial by am-
bush." Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 606 (D. Minn.
1988); McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 48 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Harges, supra
note 39, at 808-09; Spiegel, supra note 38, at 835.
94. Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516, 1518 (W.D. Mich.
1987) (toxic tort case in which one jury found for plaintiffs for $2.8 million and second
jury found for defendant); Muehler v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1370, 1372 (D.
Minn. 1985) (SJT case in which one jury awarded more than $2 million to plaintiffs,
while another found for defendant); see Metzloff, supra note 59, at 818 n.43; Wiegand,
supra note 3, at 100 & n.99.
95. Compressed Gas Corp. v. United States Steel Corp., 857 F.2d 346 (6th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989). The SJT jury found for the plaintiffs in the
amount of $200,000, while the ultimate trial jury found for the plaintiffs at $1.7 mil-
lion. See Metzloff, supra note 59, at 818 n.43; Wiegand, supra note 3, at 100 n.99.
96. Posner, supra note 66, at 374; Wiegand, supra note 3, at 100.
97. Alfini, supra note 27, at 228.
98. Id.
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erage SJT verdicts came within the dollar range of the average
settlement offers that the parties had put on the table prior to SJT.99
Some judges and scholars also have questioned whether, when man-
dating ADR mechanisms, the courts are focusing on court-centered
efficiency at the expense of party-centered interests." These critics
are concerned that mandatory SJT may lead to "judicial high-handed-
ness"''1 and coercive pressure on unwilling parties to settle cases.10
The research supports the concept that the consent of the parties to
SJT may play an important role in party perceptions of fairness and
satisfaction with the process. The Metzloff study indicated that, over-
all, jurors, attorneys and their clients, and judges were pleased with
the voluntary SJT process. 103 This level of satisfaction may be based
on the program's voluntary approach as well as the participants' op-
portunity to tailor SJT procedures to their disputes.' °4
In the Alfini study, approximately ninety-one percent of state law-
yers in the voluntary program found the SJT procedure to be ade-
quate.0 5 Of the federal lawyers in the mandatory program, only fifty-
one percent found SJT to be an adequate procedure.10 In addition,
reported client satisfaction ran significantly higher in the state pro-
gram than in the federal process."07 The Alfini study attributed some
of these perceptual differences to the consensual nature of the state
program and the importance of party attitude towards the process. °s
Concerns also have been raised about the composition of and the
legal authority for assembling SJT jurors. One concern is that the
truncated voir dire of potential jurors may not adequately screen for
bias.'09 Also, in Judge Lambros' own region, two federal district court
99. Id at 227-28. The state verdicts were much closer to the midpoint of the pre-
SJT settlement offers than were the federal SJT verdicts. Id at 228.
In the Metzloff study, it is also interesting to note that, in a majority of cases, the
parties entered into binding SJT with settlement limited to agreed upon "high-low"
parameters. Metzloff, supra note 59, at 830.
100. See In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 158 (6th Cir. 1993); Strandell v. Jackson
County, 838 F.2d 884, 887-88 (7th Cir. 1987); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 29, at 10-
12, 18-21; Vidmar & Rice, supra note 29, at 97-98.
101. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 657 (7th Cir.
1989) (Posner, J., dissenting).
102. Id at 657-58 (Posner, J., dissenting); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 29, at 11-12,
24; Vidmar & Rice, supra note 29, at 97; Webber, supra note 2, at 1517-18.
103. Metzloff, supra note 59, at 834.
104. See id. at 830; Vidmar & Rice, supra note 29, at 98-102 (suggesting use of
voluntary, binding Jury-Determined Settlement process that allows for greater party
design and control of process, including high-low award parameters).
105. Alfini, supra note 27, at 230.
106. kd Many of the federal lawyers expressed the concern that, due to case com-
plexities, they need a great deal more time to adequately present their cases. Id. at
219.
107. Id at 232-33. Client satisfaction was 89% for the state program and 51% for
the federal program. Id
108. Id. at 233-34; see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 29, at 18-25.
109. Webber, supra note 2, at 1517.
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judges challenged the courts' statutory authority to utilize jurors from
the trial pool for SJT. Each judge, narrowly interpreting statutory
law, asserted that the federal courts lack statutory authority to require
jurors to participate in an advisory fashion. 110
From an ethical perspective, SJT is criticized in cases in which jurors
are not advised that their verdict is nonbinding. Most notably, Judge
Posner questioned the ethics of withholding this information:
Never telling the jury worries me .... Telling the jurors after they
have delivered the summary verdict that the verdict is not legally
binding is only a partial anodyne for my concern .... The jurors are
still being fooled; and they are learning that juries sometimes make
decisions and at other times simply referee fake trials. As word
spreads, the conscientiousness of jurors could decline; it is almost a
detail that the utility of the summary jury trial would also decline.111
Judges can avoid this ethical problem by informing jurors of their
nonbinding role from the start, 12 but this openness may lessen juror
attention and seriousness in SJT. In the Alfini study, attorneys
asserted that not telling the jurors until after SJT is complete is impor-
tant to help maintain responsible juror determinations. 113 This practi-
cal concern is challenged by studies that indicate that mock jurors
continue to take their advisory role quite seriously in rendering non-
binding verdicts." 4
Currently, the debate over SJT's effectiveness is a contentious one,
with opponents and supporters in a seeming deadlock of mixed evi-
dence on both sides. Parties considering SJT need to balance the ben-
efits outlined by SJT supporters with criticisms raised by SJT
opponents. When a court orders SJT use, however, parties do not
have the opportunity to weigh these factors and make a reasoned de-
cision on their own. Without conclusive evidence of SJT as a success
or failure, the battle over SJT now focuses on whether the federal
courts possess the legal authority to mandate SJT without prior party
approval.
110. United States v. Exum, 748 F. Supp. 512, 513 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Hume v. M &
C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506, 510 (N.D. Ohio 1990); see Wiegand, supra note 3, at
113.
111. Posner, supra note 66, at 386-87; see Hume, 129 F.R.D. at 508 nn.3-4; Wie-
gand, supra note 3, at 114.
112. Posner, supra note 66, at 386; see Spiegel, supra note 38, at 829-30.
113. Alfini, supra note 27, at 217.
114. Harges, supra note 39, at 809-10. The author states:
Several studies have examined the level of emotional involvement of mock
jurors who are aware of the hypothetical nature of their deliberations. The
studies report that mock jury verdicts may be highly predictive of actual trial
verdicts and that mock jurors show a high degree of emotional involvement
in their work.
Id. at 809 (footnotes omitted).
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II. COURT BATrLES OVER MANDATORY SJT
Judge Lambros anticipated that SIT participation would be volun-
tary." 5 The Sixth and Seventh Circuits accept only voluntary SJT, as-
serting that mandatory SJT is allowed neither under the Rules nor as
a result of courts' authority to manage their dockets.116 But in an ef-
fort to deal with burgeoning caseloads, some federal courts have ap-
proved compulsory SJT use, without the parties' mutual agreement,
based on the Rules and the courts' inherent authority." 7 Differing
court views hinge primarily on the interpretation of the explicit lan-
guage of Rule 16 and its underlying policies as stated in the notes of
the advisory committee."18
A. Interpreting Rule 16
The Seventh Circuit case of Strandell v. Jackson County 9 involved
the first federal court to sound a sour note on mandatory SJT. This
civil rights action arose from the alleged arrest, strip search, imprison-
ment, and suicidal death of Michael Strandell. 1' After the close of
discovery, the defendants filed a motion to compel the production of
copies of witnesses' statements obtained by the plaintiffs.' Plaintiffs
argued that these materials were privileged attorney work-product
that the defendants should have requested during the discovery
phase." The court denied the defendants' motion."
The trial court suggested that the parties utilize SJT to resolve the
matter, in light of the court's crowded docket. 24 Citing attorney
115. Judge Lambros' report referred to SIT as "a noncoercive, 'no-lose' alterna-
five." Lambros, supra note 14, at 477. Professor Alfini's study suggests that the "no-
risk" assertion of SJT may not be accurate in all situations. "In cases where defend-
ants have an offer on the table, plaintiffs might experience a considerable setback with
a no-liability SJT award." Alfini, supra note 27, at 225.
116. See infra notes 117-42 and accompanying text. For articles opposing
mandatory SJT, see Metzloff, supra note 57; Posner, supra note 66; Vidmar & Rice,
supra note 29; Webber, supra note 2; Wiegand, supra note 3; O'Hearne, supra note 68.
117. See infra notes 167-85 and accompanying text. For articles favoring mandatory
SJT, see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 29; Spiegel, supra note 38; William E. Craco,
Note, Compelling Alternatives: The Authority of Federal Judges to Order Summary
Jury Trial Participation, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 483 (1988); Anne C. Morgan, Note,
Thwarting Judicial Power to Order Summary Jury Trials in Federal District Court:
Strandell v. Jackson County, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 491 (1989-1990); Note,
Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial, supra note 7.
118. See infra notes 119-85 and accompanying text. Great weight is given to the
Committee's construction of the meaning of the Rules. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946).
119. 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987); see Morgan, supra note 117 (providing critical
review of the Strandell decision).
120. 838 F.2d at 884. The parents of Michael Strandell brought the action seeking
$500,000 in damages. Id.






work-product concerns, the plaintiffs rebuffed the court's recommen-
dation of SJT use and indicated their readiness for an immediate
trial.125 The district court ordered SJT as authorized under Rule 16,
even though there was no local rule permitting its utilization.126 The
plaintiffs again refused, and the district court found the plaintiffs in
criminal contempt. 27 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit rejected the no-
tion of mandatory SJT.'2 8
The Strandell decision was followed in 1993 by the Sixth Circuit
case, In re NLO, Inc."29 This case involved employees and subcon-
tractors suing the owners of a uranium processing facility for inten-
tionally or negligently exposing them to radioactive and hazardous
materials.130 The district court mandated SJT and took the unusual
step of ordering the process to be open to the public.' 3' The district
court supported its order under Rule 16; as in Strandell, there was no
local rule in effect to allow for SJT use. 132 Relying heavily on the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Strandell, the Sixth Circuit rejected the
concept of mandatory SJT.33
In reaching their decisions, both the Strandell and In re NLO courts
narrowly construed the language and objectives of Rule 16.'13 Each
court viewed the rule as limiting the federal court's express and inher-
ent authority, rather than inviting judicial activism and innovation.135
125. Id.
126. Id. at 885-86. But see Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506, 508 n.3
(N.D. Ohio 1990) (rejecting, in dicta, Rule 16 basis for SJT).
127. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 885. Despite the clear potential for SJT abuse, thejudge's order in Strandell provides a good example of unfair pressure on a party to
participate in SJT. See Harges, supra note 39, at 808-09; Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 29, at 19-20.
128. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888. In addition, the Rule 16 debate spilled over into
concerns about the protection of attorney work-product and trial strategy and the
overall fairness and effectiveness of SJT. Id.
129. 5 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 1993).
130. Id. at 155. The plaintiffs claimed that this exposure to hazardous levels of
radioactivity increased their risk of cancer and caused emotional distress. Id. The
plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages, costs for a court-supervised
medical monitoring program, and attorneys' fees with interest. Id.
131. Id.; see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
132. 5 F.3d at 156-57. The defendant filed a petition for mandamus, and an emer-
gency stay was granted and oral argument scheduled. Id. at 155. In the earlier case of
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988), the
Sixth Circuit's dicta clearly supported the implementation of SJT under both Rule 16
and the court's inherent authority. Id. at 903 n.4. However, the Sixth Circuit later
distinguished this case on the grounds that the parties consented to SJT in Cincinnati
Gas. In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 156-57 (6th Cir. 1993).
133. In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 157.
134. Id. at 157-58; Strandell, 838 F. 2d at 886-87.
135. In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 157-58; Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 886-87
(7th Cir. 1987). Both courts of appeals also rejected the argument that mandatory




In rejecting mandatory SJT, several basic arguments surfaced from
these courts' interpretations of Rule 16.
First, both circuits strictly interpreted Rule 16 to authorize man-
datory pre-trial conferences, but not mandatory SJT.136 Under the
terms of Rule 16(a), a court may compel parties to attend a pre-trial
conference that may aid settlement. 3 7 Each court considered a
mandatory pre-trial conference to be a neutral forum for fostering set-
tlement and a normal step in the trial process.' 38 On the other hand,
these opinions viewed SJT as a coercive session that would force "an
unwilling litigant [to] be sidetracked from the normal course of
litigation.' '1
3 9
These decisions also reasoned that Rule 16(c)(7) expressly states
that the parties may consider extrajudicial alternatives to dispute reso-
lution during a pre-trial conference. 140 The courts pointed to the advi-
sory committee's notes to support the noncoercive nature of ADR use
under Rule 16(c)(7):141 "In addition to settlement, Rule 16(c)(7) re-
fers to exploring the use of procedures other than litigation to resolve
the dispute. This includes urging the litigants to employ adjudicatory
techniques outside the courthouse."1 42
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits concluded that this permissive lan-
guage provided guidance on topics that parties may discuss, but did
not force them to use extrajudicial methods such as SJT.143 The courts
also assumed that SJT imposed settlement on the parties, inconsistent
with the noncoercive policies behind Rule 16.14 This firm rejection of
compulsory SJT under narrow readings of Rule 16 and the courts' in-
herent authority, however, is inconsistent with other Sixth and Sev-
enth Circuit rulings.
For example, after Strandell, the Seventh Circuit deviated from the
express language of Rule 16 regarding compelled attendance at a pre-
trial conference of represented parties in G. Heileman Brewing Co. v.
136. In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 157-58; Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887-88.
137. In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 157; Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887.
138. In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 157-58; Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887; see Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(c)(7) (amendend 1993) advisory committee's note.
139. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887; see In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 157.
140. In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 157; Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887. "The participants at any
conference under this rule may consider and take action with respect to ... the possi-
bility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) (amended 1993).
141. In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 157; Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887.
142. Fed. P, Civ. P. 16(c)(7) (amended 1993) advisory committee's note (emphasis
added).
143. In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 157; Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887.
144. See In re NLO, 5 F.3d at 157-58; Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887. "Rule 16 ... was
not designed as a means for clubbing the parties-or one of them-into an involun-




Joseph Oat Corp.'4 5 The case involved a contract dispute between two
companies over a waste water mechanism for use in a treatment
plant. 4 6 The district court ordered the defendant to appear at a pre-
trial conference with a corporate representative with settlement au-
thority,147 even though the explicit language of Rule 16 requires only
attorneys and unrepresented parties to attend a pre-trial confer-
ence. 48 At the conference, defendant's counsel and another attorney,
authorized to speak on behalf of the corporate principals, appeared,
but no principal or corporate representative attended. 49 Citing Rule
16, the district court penalized the defendant costs and attorneys' fees
for failing to obey its order. 50
On appeal, a deeply divided court' 5' held that, despite the express
language of Rule 16, judges have the authority to compel represented
litigants to participate in a pre-trial conference.5 2 Relying heavily on
the Supreme Court case of Link v. Wabash Railroad, Co.,153 the Heile-
man court acknowledged that the federal courts' procedural authority
is not limited to the Rules or statutes when seeking to manage effec-
tively their case dockets. 4 In contrast to Strandell, the court liberally
construed Rule 16155 as encouraging judicial innovation in light of the
court's inherent authority to manage its caseload. 56 The court opined
that
[t]his authority likewise forms the basis for continued development
of procedural techniques designed to make the operation of the
court more efficient, to preserve the integrity of the judicial process,
and to control courts' dockets. Because the rules form and shape
certain aspects of a court's inherent powers, yet allow the continued
exercise of that power where discretion should be available, the
mere absence of language in the federal rules specifically authoriz-
ing or describing a particular judicial procedure should not, and
does not, give rise to a negative implication of prohibition.' 57
145. 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989); see Robert J. Keenan, Rule 16 and Pre-Trial Con-
ferences: Have We Forgotten the Most Important Ingredient?, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1449
(1990) (arguing for broader interpretation of Rule 16 as contained in the Heileman
decision).
146. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 648-49.
147. Id. at 650.
148. Id. at 651. "In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys
for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a conference or
conferences before trial .... " Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a).
149. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 650.
150. Id. Defendants were penalized $5,860.01 for their failure to have a corporate
principal attend the pre-trial conference. Id.
151. In a 6-5 decision, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's action. Five
dissents were filed, including a blistering dissent from Judge Posner. Id. at 657-71.
152. Id. at 652-53.
153. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
154. 871 F.2d at 651.
155. Id. at 652-53.
156. Id. at 651-52.
157. Id. (footnote omitted).
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With an eye towards encouraging, but not requiring, settlement,5 8
the Heileman court upheld mandatory attendance of represented liti-
gants at pre-trial conference as consistent with both the purpose and
intent of Rule 16159 as well as the court's inherent authority.1 6"
Prior to In re NLO, the Sixth Circuit upheld mandatory non-bind-
ing mediation as a legitimate precondition to trial in Rhea v. Massey-
Ferguson, Inc.161 The Sixth Circuit reviewed a local court rule that
interposed mediation as precondition to trial, concluding that the rule
did not violate the Seventh Amendment 62 or the Rules." The Rhea
court asserted that the core of the Seventh Amendment requires only
that the parties have the right to have unresolved issues ultimately
decided by a jury.'" The decision asserted that mandatory, non-bind-
ing mediation did not violate one's right to a jury trial because the
process was not considered "outcome-determinative."'" In addition,
the local rule was not inconsistent with the Rules because the author-
ized mediation process was not outcome-determinative. 66
The Strandell and In re NLO courts did not perceive SJT in a simi-
lar light as other valuable settlement tools, but as a heavy-handed pro-
cedure that unfairly sidetracks litigants and coerces undesired
settlements. These views of the SJT process are at odds with the non-
158. As the Heileman court asserted: "We do not view 'authority to settle' as a
requirement that corporate representatives must come to court willing to settle on
someone else's terms, but only that they come to court in order to consider the possi-
bility of settlement." Id. at 653.
Judge Posner did not accept this noncoercive interpretation of the court's decision,
expressing a concern that this liberal reading would encourage "judicial high-handed-
ness." Id. at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting).
159. Id at 652-53.
160. Id. See, e.g., Davison v. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 778,781 (D. Md. 1978),
aff'd, 617 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) (upholding mandatory arbitration as precondition
to trial); Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 577 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (same).
161. 767 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1985). Rhea was not overruled by the later In re NLO
decision.
162. The Seventh Amendment provides in relevant part: "In suits at common law,
... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." U.S. Const. amend. VII.
163. Id at 268-69. Local Rule 32 stated that diversity cases that involved only mon-
etary damages may be referred to nonbinding mediation as a precondition to trial. Id.
at 268.
164. Id The court stated:
The Seventh Amendment "was designed to preserve the basic institution of
the jury trial in only its most fundamental elements, not the great mass of
procedural forms and details." Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392
(1943). At the core of these fundamental elements is the right to have a
"'jury ultimately determine the issues of fact if they cannot be settled by the
parties or determined as a matter of law.'" Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuti-
cals Inc., 660 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Woods v. Holy Cross
Hospital, 591 F.2d 1164,1178 (5th Cir. 1979)); see also Ex parte Peterson, 253
U.S. 300, 310 (1920).
Id
165. Id. at 268.
166. Id. at 269.
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binding settlement process envisioned by Judge Lambros. Both the
Sixth and Seventh Circuits seem to overlook that SJT, like mandatory
pre-trial conference or mediation, does not require settlement. In
fact, none of these nonbinding processes are "outcome-determina-
tive" since they do not prevent parties from seeking a trial on the
merits if negotiations are unsuccessful. Apprehension of mandatory
SJT is inconsistent with support of mandatory pre-trial conferences
and mediation. This sort of line-drawing between various nonbinding
settlement tools seems more based in the courts' rejection of SJT as a
settlement tool than in actual Rule 16 distinctions.
Several other district courts examined the same Rule 16 and arrived
at opposite conclusions on mandatory SJT than did Strandell and In re
NLO. District court decisions in Arabian American Oil Co. v.
Scarfone,167 McKay v. Ashland Oil Inc. ,168 and Federal Reserve Bank
v. Carey-Canada, Inc.1 69 support mandatory SJT under Rule 16 as well
as the courts' inherent authority. Similar to the Sixth Circuit's view in
Heileman, these district courts viewed Rule 16 as expanding judicial
authority to manage caseloads and challenging courts to consider in-
novative dispute resolution techniques.170 In light of this perspective,
these courts determined that mandatory SJT is wholly consistent with
the settlement goals of Rule 16.'7'
[I]t is difficult to reconcile the argument that Rule 16 does not per-
mit courts to order the parties to participate in summary jury trials
with the [settlement] goals of that rule. It is hard to imagine that
the drafters of the 1983 amendments actually intended to strengthen
courts' ability to manage caseloads while at the same time intended
to deny the court the power to compel participation by the parties
to the litigation. 72
As further support for this view, the Arabian American Oil and Mc-
Kay courts looked to the 1984 Judicial Conference resolution endors-
ing SJT. The resolution deleted draft language limiting SJT use to the
167. 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1988) ("This Court finds the summary trial to
be a legitimate device to be used to implement the policy of this Court to provide
litigants with the most expeditious and just case resolution.").
168. 120 F.R.D. 43, 44 (E.D. Ky. 1988) ("[Tjhe court finds itself in respectful disa-
greement with the Seventh Circuit on the inherent power and Federal Rules issues
169. 123 F.R.D. 603, 606 (D. Minn. 1988) ("[T]he view of the Seventh Circuit is
rejected .... [T]he parties may be compelled to participate in settlement efforts, such
as the SJT.").
170. Federal Reserve Bank, 123 F.R.D. at 604, 606-07; McKay, 120 F.R.D at 47-48;
Arabian Am. Oil, 119 F.R.D. at 448-49.
171. Federal Reserve Bank, 123 F.R.D. at 606-08; McKay, 120 F.R.D at 47-49; Ara-
bian Am. Oil, 119 F.R.D. at 448.
172. Federal Reserve Bank, 123 F.R.D. at 607; McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 48; Arabian
Am. Oil, 119 F.R.D. at 448.
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voluntary consent of parties, assuming that compelled participation
was authorized under the Rules.1 73
Viewing Rule 16 as a positive call to judicial innovation, these dis-
trict courts concluded that mandatory SJT was within the court's in-
herent authority. 74 The McKay and Federal Reserve Bank courts
pointed in part to the "outcome-determinative" test of Rhea.17 The
McKay court further amplified the Rhea approach through its analysis
of the Supreme Court case of Colgrove v. Battin.76
In Colgrove, the Supreme Court reviewed a local federal court rule
that reduced a civil trial jury from twelve to six.'" The Court held
that this change did not violate the Seventh Amendment or the
Rules. 78 The Colgrove decision stated that the Constitution does not
deny the courts authority to demonstrate reasonable procedural flexi-
bility and innovation under the Rules to meet changing times.' 79 The
Court stated that "'[new devices may be used to adapt the ancient
institution to present needs and to make of it an efficient instrument
in the administration of justice.... [Such changes] are essential to the
preservation of the right' of trial by jury."m
The Court asserted that the only limit on this exercise of authority
was that the innovations should not be "outcome-determinative"; that
is, they should not seriously interfere with or prevent the ultimate de-
termination of the case by a jury.' 8' Neither courts nor legal critics
have claimed that SJT is "outcome-determinative." Since SJT is not
"outcome-determinative," legal distinctions between differing forms
of nonbinding pre-trial settlement tools under Rule 16 were not justi-
fied."8 ' As the Arabian American Oil court explained:
173. Federal Reserve Bank, 123 F.R.D. at 607; McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 48.
174. Federal Reserve Bank, 123 F.R.D. at 604; McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 45-46; Arabian
Am. Oil, 119 F.R.D. at 449; see supra note 19 and accompanying text. See also Twitty
v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 26 Phila. 92, 95 (1993) (upholding state court's in-
herent power to compel party attendance at nonbinding summary jury trial).
175. Federal Reserve Bank, 123 F.R.D. at 605; McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 45; see supra
notes 161-66 and accompanying text. The court in Arabian American Oil based its
broad reading on the court's Article III constitutional responsibility to resolve dis-
putes within its jurisdiction. 119 F.R.D. at 449.
176. 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
177. Id. at 149-50.
178. Id. at 158.
179. Id. at 160-62.
180. Id at 157, 162 (quoting Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309-10 (1920)).
181. Id. at 157. "The limitation imposed by the Amendment is merely that enjoy-
ment of the right of trial by jury be not obstructed, and that the ultimate determina-
tion of issues of fact by the jury be not interfered with." Id. at 160 n.17 (quoting &X
parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309-10 (1920)).
182. Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 607 (D. Minn.
1988); McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 46, 48 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Arabian
American Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988). The McKay
decision stated:
A summary jury trial is far less intrusive into the independence of the trial
lawyer or litigant than the local rules upheld by the above authorities. No
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Rule 16 calls these procedures conferences, but what is in a name.
The obvious purpose and aim of Rule 16 is to allow courts the dis-
cretion and processes necessary for intelligent and effective case
management and disposition. Whatever the name the judge may
give to these proceedings their purposes are the same and are sanc-
tioned by Rule 16.183
Therefore, like mandatory pre-trial conferences and mediation,
mandatory SJT does not deny parties any substantive rights, including
the ultimate opportunity for a jury trial."&4 In essence, mandatory SJT
is just another form of pre-trial conference or nonbinding mediation
from which settlement may result, not a coercive club for imposing
settlement as envisioned by Strandell and In re NLO.18 s Yet the divi-
sions between the federal courts stood until recent statutory changes
eroded the bases used to reject compulsory SJT.
B. Statutory Revisions Settle SJT Debate
The case law and critics rejecting mandatory SJT relied heavily on
the lack of express authority for SJT under the Rules or other statu-
tory law. Statutory changes in the 1990s reflect the public's growing
discontent with the courts and the demand for quicker, cheaper dis-
pute resolution.
First, the enactment of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990186
(the "Act") illustrates increasing legislative demands for courts to
take a more active role in streamlining case processing. The Act spe-
cifically directs federal courts to draft a civil justice expense and delay
reduction plan.' 7 In developing the plan, each district court must
presumption of correctness attaches to the verdict of the summary jury, nor
is any sanction imposed for failure to accept its advisory verdict. It is merely
a useful settlement device. It may require an expenditure of time and prepa-
ration but so do pretrial orders, memoranda, conferences, marking of exhib-
its, etc. In no way is the summary jury trial "outcome-determinative" under
the Supreme Court's Colgrove test.
120 F.R.D. at 46.
183. 119 F.R.D. at 448.
184. Federal Reserve Bank, 123 F.R.D. at 605; McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 46; Arabian
Am. Oil, 119 F.R.D. at 449. The SJT actually may assist in narrowing the issues and
improving preparation for a subsequent trial. See supra notes 167-83 and accompany-
ing text.
185. Federal Reserve Bank, 123 F.R.D. at 607; McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 48; Arabian
Am. Oil, 119 F.R.D. at 448; see Morgan, supra note 116, at 509.
186. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1993).
187. Id. § 473. The pertinent section of the amended law states:
(a) In formulating the provisions of its civil justice expense and delay reduc-
tion plan, each United States district court, in consultation with an advi-
sory group appointed under section 478 of this title, shall consider and
may include the following principles and guidelines of litigation manage-
ment and cost and delay reduction:...
(6) authorization to refer appropriate cases to alternative dispute reso-
lution programs that-
(A) have been designated for use in a district court; or
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work with an advisory committee of lawyers and major litigants to
develop policies for better managing the docket and reducing costs
and delays.'tm The formulated plan should institute appropriate ADR
programs. The Act specifically mentions SJT as a permissible ADR
option.189
More importantly, the December 1993 amendments have dimin-
ished confusion over the meaning of Rule 16.190 These changes have
put much of the court debate over mandatory SJT and other forms of
mandatory ADR to rest. Amended Rule 16 states:
(c) Subjects for Consideration at Pretrial Conferences. At any con-
ference under this rule consideration may be given, and the court
may take appropriate action, with respect to...
(9) settlement and the use of special procedures to assist in
resolving the dispute when authorized by statute or local rule
191
Although the revision to the Rule may appear to be minor,19 a
major clarification of the Rule's meaning comes from the advisory
committee's explanatory notes that the Strandell and In re NLO
courts relied upon to reject SJT. The revised drafters' notes spell out
more clearly the varied types of settlement procedures that may be
utilized and the court's authority to compel participation in these
processes.
"Paragraph (9) is revised to describe more accurately the various
procedures that, in addition to traditional settlement conferences,
may be helpful in settling litigation. Even if a case cannot immedi-
ately be settled, the judge and attorneys can explore possible use of
alternative procedures such as mini-trials, summary jury trials, medi-
ation, neutral evaluation, and nonbinding arbitration that can lead to
consensual resolution of the dispute without a full trial on the mer-
its. The rule acknowledges the presence of statutes and local rules
or plans that may authorize use of some of these procedures even
when not agreed to by the parties. 1
93
(B) the court may make available, including mediation, minitrial,
and summary jury trial.
Id. § 473 (a)(6)(A),(B).
188. Id § 478.
189. Id. § 473 (a)(6)(B).
190. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16. Amended Rule 16 took effect on December 1, 1993. See
Joseph T. McLaughlin & Karen M. Crupi, Development in ADR Summary Jury Tri-
als, N.Y. LJ., Feb. 1, 1994, at 1 (discussing mandatory SJT based upon changes in
Rule 16 notes); Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Nat'l L.J., June
7, 1993, at S1, S5 [hereinafter Amendments to Rules].
191. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9); see McLaughlin & Crupi, supra note 190, at 1; Amend-
ments to Rules, supra note 190, at $3-$5.
192. This amended provision replaces former Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7), which stated
that pre-trial conferences could be used to consider "the possibility of settlement or
the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute."
193. Amendments to Rules, supra note 190, at S3-S5 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(c)(9) advisory committee's note) (emphasis added).
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In contrast with the narrow interpretations in Strandell.and In re
NLO, the drafters' notes make it clear that Rule 16 is intended to
broaden court authority to promote settlement as originally asserted
in Arabian American Oil, McKay, and Federal Reserve Bank. The
notes specifically state that mechanisms such as SJT are valid exer-
cises of court authority to encourage settlement. Not only may courts
consider SJT, but courts may compel party participation under statute,
local rules or local plans.194 The Rule 16 drafters' notes that the Sixth
and Seventh Circuits relied upon so heavily no longer support their
view. The new drafters' notes endorse the use of mandatory SJT as an
acceptable settlement device, regardless of party approval. Therefore,
SJT is not the unwarranted extension of judicial power previously as-
serted by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.
However, the notes leave open the issue of a court's inherent au-
thority to mandate SJT in the absence of statute or local rules.195
"'The rule does not attempt to resolve questions as to the extent a
court would be authorized to require such proceedings as an exercise
of its inherent powers.' "196 Although a Supreme Court case may fi-
nally settle this issue, the new Rule 16 notes, coupled with the Col-
grove case, suggest that innovative settlement mechanisms such as SJT
are likely to be viewed as valid exercises of inherent court
authority.197
III. EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
Regardless of one's view of SJT, these recent legal revisions clearly
support federal court authority to compel participation in SJT. How-
ever, these revisions do not address the manner in which judges
should exercise this authority. Obviously, the indiscriminate use of
SJT will not help the courts, parties, or attorneys to achieve the goals
of fair, rapid, and cost-effective dispute resolution.
98
A. Recommendations for Case Screening and Resolution
Federal courts should consider basic guidelines to aid judges in their
screening and processing of cases for mandatory SJT and institute
mechanisms for evaluating the effectiveness of SJT use. Any policies
drafted should strive to maximize the benefits of SJT while taking into
account some of the main criticisms of SJT outlined above. Some fun-
194. See McLaughlin & Crupi, supra note 190, at 1.
195. Amendments to Rules, supra note 190, at S3-S5.
196. Id. at S3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9) advisory committee's note). There
were no local rules or plans at issue in the Strandell and In re NLO, Inc. cases. See
supra notes 119-44 and accompanying text.
197. McLaughlin & Crupi, supra note 190, at 1; see Craco, supra note 117, at 495-
99.
198. Metzloff, supra note 59, at 821.
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damental considerations for selecting and processing cases through
mandatory SJT are as follows:
1. Restrict SJT use to private disputes. SJT cases should involve pri-
vate disputes in which all the parties affected are before the court.
Cases that involve a substantial public interest, such as the civil rights
action against the police department in Strandell or the dispute over
the design and construction of the nuclear power plant found in Cin-
cinnati Gas, should not be resolved in the private arena of SJT. Public
interest cases should receive open court determination to inform the
public about the dispute and to lay the groundwork for valuable court
precedent.199
2. Consider anticipated savings for both the courts and the parties.
SJT often is criticized as being too court-centered and for merely ad-
ding another costly step in the litigation process. Before selecting a
case for mandatory SJT, judges should balance carefully the potential
time and cost impact of the case not only on the court, but also on the
disputants. Any decision to mandate SJT should be founded upon a
clear understanding of potential cost and time savings for all parties
involved. For example, the attorneys in the Arabian American Oil
case anticipated seven courtroom weeks to try their dispute.200 The
judge's requirement that they consider a two-day SJT prior to this
enormous expenditure of time and money2"' is reasonable and fair to
both the court and the parties. Even if settlement is not achieved, SJT
may help to clarify issues and improve attorney preparedness that can
save time and money during the actual trial.202
3. Limit opportunities for discovery or work-product abuse. As a sy-
nopsis of a trial, the SJT is based on the information disclosed during
the pre-trial discovery process. Prior to trial, judges mandate compre-
hensive pre-trial orders that include the exchange of witness lists and
summaries of testimony, and the identification of exhibits. These pre-
trial orders are aimed at avoiding surprise at the time of trial and en-
couraging settlement before trial.2 3 Clear pre-SJT rulings on dis-
puted evidentiary issues will clarify the materials that may properly be
presented to the advisory jury. Judicial vigilance during SJT will avoid
attempts to skew SJT verdicts through the introduction of surprise or
inadmissible evidence. In addition, judges should use their experience
to evaluate party conduct during discovery for hints of potential bad
faith or abuse during SJT. The Strandell case is a good example of
how one party could have abused SJT to make up for a failure to
199. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
200. Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 ((M.D. Fla. 1988).
201. Id
202. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
203. See. e.g., Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 606 (D.
Minn. 1988) (asserting that "trial by ambush" is no longer accepted in federal civil
trials); McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 48 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (same).
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undertake diligent discovery. In situations like Strandell, judges
would be well-advised to avoid mandatory SJT.
4. Case complexity should be considered before mandating SJT.
Judge Lambros indicated that courts successfully have utilized SJT in
both complex and simple cases involving varied areas of substantive
law and numerous parties. The judge based this contention upon the
voluntary use of SJT, which may explain some of its success.z" The
subsequent Alfini and Metzloff studies, dealing with both voluntary
and mandatory SJT programs, suggest that SJT may be unfair or inef-
fective in cases involving multiple parties and complex issues of law
and fact.2"5 Judges should therefore account for case complexity
before ordering mandatory SJT. Judges should consider single plain-
tiff-single defendant cases with few critical issues of law and fact in
dispute (e.g., primarily damage valuation) as good candidates for com-
pulsory SJT use. Cases involving multiple parties and complex issues
may be better served by voluntary SJT, full trials, or arbitration before
experienced arbitrators.
5. Ensure process and document confidentiality. Unlike the situation
in In re NLO, confidentiality should be guaranteed both during and
after the completion of the process as asserted in Cincinnati Gas.20 6
Confidentiality will help to assuage parties' concerns that skewed
summary information is being provided to the general public without
adequate evidentiary or procedural safeguards. Proper judicial super-
vision and the rejection of public interest cases can avoid concerns
about abuses of SJT confidentiality.
6. Allow opportunities for parties to control and design SJT proce-
dures. The Alfini and Metzloff studies show that party control over
SJT will improve party satisfaction with the fairness of the process and
the quality of the outcomes. 0 7 Concerns about mandatory SJT may
be lessened if parties, in cooperation with the judge, are permitted the
opportunity to tailor the procedure to better suit their individual dis-
putes. Areas for process design and control could easily include (1)
the scheduling of acceptable SJT dates, (2) methods of jury selection
and jury size, (3) length of summary presentations, (4) utilization of
live or videotaped testimony with opportunities for cross-examination
(particularly when witness credibility is critical), (5) high-low parame-
ters for jury awards, (6) input on jury instructions, and (7) the binding
or nonbinding nature of process.208 By allowing the parties to take a
more active role in designing the process, participants in mandatory
SJT may feel more confident about the quality and fairness of process
outcomes.
204. See supra notes 32, 36-39 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
208. Metzloff, supra note 59, at 858-960; Vidmar & Rice, supra note 29, at 100.
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7. Inform the jury of its advisory role in advance. Judge Posner's
concern about the ethics of not telling the jury is well-founded. 209
Judges should take the time to explain to the jury its important advi-
sory role in SJT. Judges should inform jurors that their efforts to
render fair, advisory SJT verdicts may help to speed up case process-
ing, decrease court backlogs, and reduce party and court time and
costs. Jurors, as taxpayers, are concerned about court costs and, as
seekers of justice, are concerned about fairness and efficiency in case
processing. If properly informed about the benefits of their advisory
verdict, jurors will be more likely to appreciate the seriousness and
importance of their role.
8. Create record-keeping systems to evaluate SJT use. Although
mandatory SJT has many critics, SJT may provide the opportunity for
greater judicial innovation to help manage overcrowded dockets and
to lessen excessive costs and delays. With the federal courts' authority
to mandate SJT, the groundwork can be laid for more in-depth re-
search on the overall effectiveness of both mandatory and voluntary
SJT. Courts should institute record-keeping systems that will more
adequately measure the efficiency, cost benefits, and quality of out-
comes of both types of SJT. Once such systems are in place, SJT's
role in resolving civil disputes can be effectively tested and
determined.210
9. Promote the use of voluntary SJT through attorney education. As
the Metzloff study suggests, obstacles to voluntary SJT use may be
traced, in part, to the lack of attorney familiarity with the process.2"
The courts can make greater efforts to educate practicing attorneys
about the process. Courts should sponsor informational sessions and
continuing legal education workshops to help attorneys recognize the
process, benefits, and flaws of SJT use. Law schools should introduce
students to SJT and other ADR mechanisms. With a better under-
standing of the process, lawyers will be able to assist their clients in
making informed decisions about voluntary SJT use and to help re-
lieve concerns about mandatory SJT.
CONCLUSION
SJT is an innovative ADR mechanism aimed at preserving party
and judicial resources through more predictive and efficient dispute
resolution. Unfortunately, the limited studies of SJT provide incon-
clusive results on SJT's ability to meet these goals. Despite the lack of
definitive evidence to support SJT use, recent amendments to Rule 16
and its explanatory notes clearly support compelled participation in
SJT and other ADR processes. The Colgrove Supreme Court case
209. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
210. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 29, at 43-44.
211. Metzloff, supra note 59, at 837; see Craco, supra note 117, at 499.
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provides further support for the courts' inherent authority to mandate
SJT. Federal court guidelines on case selection and screening are
needed to maximize SJT advantages and minimize SJT disadvantages.
In addition, with mandatory SJT in place, courts will be able to estab-
lish evaluation procedures to help measure the fairness and efficiency
of the process as well as the quality of its outcomes. Mandatory SJT
marks an opportunity for courts to assess more accurately whether the
theoretical benefits of SJT can be demonstrated in practice.
